diff --git a/bundle-audit-time.txt b/bundle-audit-time.txt
index 8094977c..ed21d560 100644
--- a/bundle-audit-time.txt
+++ b/bundle-audit-time.txt
@@ -1 +1 @@
-2026-02-24T10:09:45+01:00
+2026-02-24T10:13:58+01:00
diff --git a/bundle-audit.json b/bundle-audit.json
index 22f0a8fc..9dbdef9b 100644
--- a/bundle-audit.json
+++ b/bundle-audit.json
@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":"0.9.3","created_at":"2026-02-24 10:09:44 +0100","results":[{"type":"unpatched_gem","gem":{"name":"nokogiri","version":"1.18.10"},"advisory":{"path":"/home/wiseadvice/.local/share/ruby-advisory-db/gems/nokogiri/GHSA-wx95-c6cv-8532.yml","id":"GHSA-wx95-c6cv-8532","url":"https://github.com/sparklemotion/nokogiri/security/advisories/GHSA-wx95-c6cv-8532","title":"Nokogiri does not check the return value from xmlC14NExecute","date":"2026-02-18","description":"## Summary\n\nNokogiri's CRuby extension fails to check the return value from\n`xmlC14NExecute` in the method `Nokogiri::XML::Document#canonicalize`\nand `Nokogiri::XML::Node#canonicalize`. When canonicalization fails,\nan empty string is returned instead of raising an exception. This\nincorrect return value may allow downstream libraries to accept\ninvalid or incomplete canonicalized XML, which has been demonstrated\nto enable signature validation bypass in SAML libraries.\n\nJRuby is not affected, as the Java implementation correctly\nraises `RuntimeError` on canonicalization failure.\n\n## Mitigation\n\nUpgrade to Nokogiri `>= 1.19.1`.\n\n## Severity\n\nThe maintainers have assessed this as **Medium** severity. Nokogiri\nitself is a parsing library without a clear security boundary\nrelated to canonicalization, so the direct impact is that a method\nreturns incorrect data on invalid input. However, this behavior\nwas exploited in practice to bypass SAML signature validation\nin downstream libraries (see References).\n\n## Credit\n\nThis vulnerability was responsibly reported by HackerOne\nresearcher `d4d`.\n","cvss_v2":null,"cvss_v3":5.3,"cve":null,"osvdb":null,"ghsa":"wx95-c6cv-8532","unaffected_versions":["< 1.5.1"],"patched_versions":[">= 1.19.1"],"criticality":"medium"}},{"type":"unpatched_gem","gem":{"name":"rack","version":"3.2.4"},"advisory":{"path":"/home/wiseadvice/.local/share/ruby-advisory-db/gems/rack/CVE-2026-22860.yml","id":"CVE-2026-22860","url":"https://github.com/rack/rack/security/advisories/GHSA-mxw3-3hh2-x2mh","title":"Rack has a Directory Traversal via Rack:Directory","date":"2026-02-17","description":"## Summary\n\n`Rack::Directory`’s path check used a string prefix match\non the expanded path. A request like `/../root_example/` can escape the configured\nroot if the target path starts with the root string, allowing directory listing\noutside the intended root.\n\n## Details\n\nIn `directory.rb`, `File.expand_path(File.join(root,\npath_info)).start_with?(root)` does not enforce a path boundary. If the server root\nis `/var/www/root`, a path like `/var/www/root_backup` passes the check because\nit shares the same prefix, so `Rack::Directory` will list that directory also.\n\n## Impact\n\nInformation disclosure via directory listing outside the configured root\nwhen `Rack::Directory` is exposed to untrusted clients and a directory shares the\nroot prefix (e.g., `public2`, `www_backup`).\n\n## Mitigation\n\n* Update to a patched\nversion of Rack that correctly checks the root prefix.\\n* Don't name directories\nwith the same prefix as one which is exposed via `Rack::Directory`.\"","cvss_v2":null,"cvss_v3":7.5,"cve":"2026-22860","osvdb":null,"ghsa":"mxw3-3hh2-x2mh","unaffected_versions":[],"patched_versions":["~> 2.2.22","~> 3.1.20",">= 3.2.5"],"criticality":"high"}},{"type":"unpatched_gem","gem":{"name":"rack","version":"3.2.4"},"advisory":{"path":"/home/wiseadvice/.local/share/ruby-advisory-db/gems/rack/CVE-2026-25500.yml","id":"CVE-2026-25500","url":"https://github.com/rack/rack/security/advisories/GHSA-whrj-4476-wvmp","title":"Stored XSS in Rack::Directory via javascript: filenames rendered into anchor href","date":"2026-02-17","description":"## Summary\n\n`Rack::Directory` generates an HTML directory index where each file entry is rendered as a clickable link. If a file exists on disk whose basename begins with the `javascript:` scheme (e.g. `javascript:alert(1)`), the generated index includes an anchor whose `href` attribute is exactly `javascript:alert(1)`. Clicking this entry executes arbitrary JavaScript in the context of the hosting application.\n\nThis results in a client-side XSS condition in directory listings generated by `Rack::Directory`.\n\n## Details\n\n`Rack::Directory` renders directory entries using an HTML row template similar to:\n\n```html\n<a href='%s'>%s</a>\n```\n\nThe `%s` placeholder is populated directly with the file’s basename. If the basename begins with `javascript:`, the resulting HTML contains an executable JavaScript URL:\n\n```html\n<a href='javascript:alert(1)'>javascript:alert(1)</a>\n```\n\nBecause the value is inserted directly into the `href` attribute without scheme validation or normalization, browsers interpret it as a JavaScript URI. When a user clicks the link, the JavaScript executes in the origin of the Rack application.\n\n## Impact\n\nIf `Rack::Directory` is used to expose filesystem contents over HTTP, an attacker who can create or upload files within that directory may introduce a malicious filename beginning with `javascript:`.\n\nWhen a user visits the directory listing and clicks the entry, arbitrary JavaScript executes in the application's origin. Exploitation requires user interaction (clicking the malicious entry).\n\n## Mitigation\n\n* Update to a patched version of Rack in which `Rack::Directory` prefixes generated anchors with a relative path indicator (e.g. `./filename`).\n* Avoid exposing user-controlled directories via `Rack::Directory`.\n* Apply a strict Content Security Policy (CSP) to reduce impact of potential client-side execution issues.\n* Where feasible, restrict or sanitize uploaded filenames to disallow dangerous URI scheme prefixes.","cvss_v2":null,"cvss_v3":5.4,"cve":"2026-25500","osvdb":null,"ghsa":"whrj-4476-wvmp","unaffected_versions":[],"patched_versions":["~> 2.2.22","~> 3.1.20",">= 3.2.5"],"criticality":"medium"}}]}
\ No newline at end of file
+{"version":"0.9.3","created_at":"2026-02-24 10:13:58 +0100","results":[]}
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/report.txt b/report.txt
index 16714cc0..8900c02c 100644
--- a/report.txt
+++ b/report.txt
@@ -1,27 +1 @@
-Name: nokogiri
-Version: 1.18.10
-GHSA: GHSA-wx95-c6cv-8532
-Criticality: Medium
-URL: https://github.com/sparklemotion/nokogiri/security/advisories/GHSA-wx95-c6cv-8532
-Title: Nokogiri does not check the return value from xmlC14NExecute
-Solution: update to '>= 1.19.1'
-
-Name: rack
-Version: 3.2.4
-CVE: CVE-2026-22860
-GHSA: GHSA-mxw3-3hh2-x2mh
-Criticality: High
-URL: https://github.com/rack/rack/security/advisories/GHSA-mxw3-3hh2-x2mh
-Title: Rack has a Directory Traversal via Rack:Directory
-Solution: update to '~> 2.2.22', '~> 3.1.20', '>= 3.2.5'
-
-Name: rack
-Version: 3.2.4
-CVE: CVE-2026-25500
-GHSA: GHSA-whrj-4476-wvmp
-Criticality: Medium
-URL: https://github.com/rack/rack/security/advisories/GHSA-whrj-4476-wvmp
-Title: Stored XSS in Rack::Directory via javascript: filenames rendered into anchor href
-Solution: update to '~> 2.2.22', '~> 3.1.20', '>= 3.2.5'
-
-Vulnerabilities found!
+No vulnerabilities found
diff --git a/update-info.txt b/update-info.txt
index d7d2697c..3585938a 100644
--- a/update-info.txt
+++ b/update-info.txt
@@ -1,13 +1,5 @@
 Updating ruby-advisory-db ...
-Updating ceb1564..23d78a1
-Fast-forward
- gems/nokogiri/GHSA-wx95-c6cv-8532.yml | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- gems/rack/CVE-2026-22860.yml          | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- gems/rack/CVE-2026-25500.yml          | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- 3 files changed, 142 insertions(+)
- create mode 100644 gems/nokogiri/GHSA-wx95-c6cv-8532.yml
- create mode 100644 gems/rack/CVE-2026-22860.yml
- create mode 100644 gems/rack/CVE-2026-25500.yml
+Already up to date.
 Updated ruby-advisory-db
 ruby-advisory-db:
   advisories:	1061 advisories